The State of Utah v. Vaughn Humphrey, Harry Jamar Gordan, and Bruce Mathews : Petition for Writ of Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
The State of Utah v. Vaughn Humphrey, Harry
Jamar Gordan, and Bruce Mathews : Petition for
Writ of Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Sandra L. Sjorgren; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
James C. Brandshaw; Elizabeth A. Bowman; Nancy Bergenson; Elizabeth Holbrook; Attorneys for
Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Humphrey, No. 900434.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3190
UTAH 
DC r ' " r N T 
KF 
4f.9 
.S9 
DOCKET NO. 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BRIEF 
3o*om 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
Vaughn Humphrey# 
Harry Jamar Gordan# 
and Bruce Mathews# 
Defendants/Appellants« 
100i$i 
Case No. 890424-CA 
890130-CA 
890666-CA 
Priority No. 13 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Petition for writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, upon its affirmance of three district court rulings 
indicating that district courts do not have jurisdiction over 
quashal of bindover orders issued by magistrates following 
preliminary hearings. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN 
NANCY BERGESON 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
424 East 500 South, Suite 30*5 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Stf 1 3 WO 
OFFICE OF 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
~<V_ 1 8 9 6 , # ' 
STATE OF UTAH 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - AIIOKMV GIMKM 
236 S I M h C A P I I O L • SAI1 LAhi- CIT\ , UI AH 84114 • T H LPHONI- 801 538 1015 • 
JOSEPH E TESCH 
CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
October 2, 1990 
OCT 2 1990 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
qoomy 
Re: State v. Vaughn Humphrey, et ah 
Case No. 890424-CA 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
The respondent, State of Utah, hereby waives the right 
to file a Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
in the above-referenced case pursuant to Rule 47(d), Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. This waiver does not constitute a 
stipulation that the petition should be granted, but rather, it 
is respondent's position that the petition should be denied based 
upon the legal analysis contained in the Brief of Respondent and 
the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals which are attached to 
this letter. In the event that the Court deems an additional 
response by the State necessary to its determination, a Brief in 
Opposition will be provided. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Very truly yours, 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
SLS:jln 
cc: Elizabeth Holbrook, Attorney for Petitioner 
Enclosures 
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the placement of the signs on specific sites 
which were the same locations occupied by 
•the signs at the time the present parties 
**ecuted the existing tease, and that the 
parties intended the tease to continue Rea-
gan's right to maintain the signs only in 
their existing locations. Although the evi-
dence is controverted, "we assume that the 
trial judge believed those aspects of the 
{evidence and the inferences reasonably 
-drawn from them that support his deci-
sion.'! Redevelopment Agency, 785 ?M 
at 1122 (quoting Brixen & Christopher, 
Architects v. Elton, TH P.2d 1039, 1042 
(Utah CtApp.1989)). Under our standard 
of review, we will not set aside a trial 
court's findings unless they are against the 
clear weight of the evidence or we other-
wise reach a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made, Smith v. 
Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 
1224-1225 (Utah CtApp.1990), and we give 
deference to the trial court's findings and 
its opportunity to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
Having examined the record, we con-
dude that the trial court's findings have 
adequate evidentiary support and are not 
clearly erroneous. We, therefore, affirm 
its judgment. 
BILLINGS and ORME, JJ., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Vaughn HUMPHREY, Defendant 
and Appellant 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Harry Jamar GORDON, Defendant 
and Appellant 
Nos. 890424-CA, 890130-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 14, 1990. 
Defendants charged with felonies chal-
lenged circuit court orders binding them 
-Over for trial, 'fhe Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya and 
Frank G. Noel, JJ., declined to exercise 
jurisdiction, and defendants appealed. Ap-
peals ware consolidated. The Court of Ap-
peals, Billings, J., held that (1) defendants' 
requests for review of legality of bindover 
orders did not invoke district court's origi-
nal jurisdiction, but rather were more accu-
rately characterized as appeals, and (2) de-
fendants' requests were not within appel-
late jurisdiction of district court. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law t»1004 
Defendants' motions to quash circuit 
court bindover orders did not invoke dis-
trict court's broad original jurisdiction, but 
rather were more accurately characterized 
as appeal, inasmuch as defendants sought 
review of substantive merits of bindover 
orders on records. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-
10(c), 77-35-12(bKl); Const Art 8, J 5. 
2. Criminal Law *=>1018 
District court's appellate jurisdiction 
must be conferred by statute. Const Art 
8, § 5 . 
S. Criminal Law *»1018 
District court did not have appellate 
jurisdiction over defendant's challenge to 
circuit court orders binding defendants 
over for trial, in absence of any statutory 
delegation of appellate jurisdiction to dis-
trict court; legislature vested appellate jur-
isdiction over circuit court proceedings in 
Court of Appeals. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-15, 
77-35-7, 78-2a-3(2Xd), 78-3-4(5). 
Elizabeth Bowman, Elizabeth Holbrook 
(argued), Salt Lake City, Salt Lake Legs) 
Defender Ass'n, for defendant and appe-
lant, Humphrey. 
James C. Bradshaw, Elizabeth Holbrook 
(argued), Salt Lake City, Salt Lake UP1 
Defender Ass'n, for defendant and appe-
lant, Gordon. 
STATE T. HUMPHREY Utah 497 
Cite as 794 M d 4*6 (UtabApp. 19M) 
R. Paul Van Dajn, Atty. Gen., Sandra To resolve this jurisdictional question, we 
Sjogren (argued), Asst Atty. Gen., Salt review the recent constitutional and statu-
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee the tory changes in the jurisdiction of the die-
State. trict courts and the contemporaneous provi-
sions which created the Utah Court of Ap-
OPINION peals. As such, we are faced with an issue 
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and of first impression. 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
We have consolidated two criminal, inter-
locutory appeals for decision as they 
present the identical legal issue. Appel-
lants Vaughn Humphrey ("Humphrey") 
and Harry Jamar Gordon ("Gordon") ap-
peal from two separate decisions of a dis-
trict court wherein the trial judge conclud-
ed the district court did not have jurisdic-
tion to review defendants' bindover orders 
from circuit court We affirm. 
Humphrey was charged with sixteen sec-
ond or third degree felonies. Gordon was 
charged with manslaughter, a second de-
gree felony. In both cases, the circuit 
court held preliminary hearings and bound 
defendants over for trial Both defendants 
were ultimately arraigned before the dis-
trict court 
Subsequently, Humphrey and Gordon 
each filed a "motion to quash" his respec-
tive bindover in district court, alleging the 
state had failed to establish probable cause 
that he had committed the crimes with 
which he was charged. In response, the 
state argued the district court had no juris-
diction to consider defendants' motions. 
The district courts concluded defendants 
were, in substance, seeking an appellate 
review on the record of the circuit courts' 
bindover orders and that jurisdiction of 
these interlocutory appeals was vested in 
the Utah Court of Appeals, not the district 
court Humphrey and Gordon then filed 
these interlocutory appeals. 
This consolidated opinion requires us to 
determine whether the district courts prop-
erly declined to exercise jurisdiction. This 
presents a question of law and thus we 
accord no deference to the trial courts' 
conclusions, but review them under a "cor-
rectness" standard. City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990). 
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 
[1] Initially, defendants argue their mo-
tions to quash their bindover orders in-
voked the district court's original jurisdic-
tion. J 
Article VHI, section 5 of the Utah Con-
stitution currently provides, in pertinent 
part 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters except as limit-
ed by this constitution or by statute, and 
power to issue all extraordinary writs. 
Utah Const art VIII, § 5. 
The district courts are given broad origi-
nal jurisdiction by the Utah Constitution 
limited only by specific constitutional or 
statutory provisions. Statutory reference 
to the district court's original jurisdiction 
does not limit its broad jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1989) pro-
vides: 'The district court has original juris-
diction in all matters civil and crimi-
nal.... " Id at § 7&-3-4(l). We disagree 
that the defendants' motions to quash their 
bindover orders invoked the original juris-
diction of the district courts. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently dealt 
with the issue of what constitutes an ap-
peal. Although the supreme court held 
that the constitutional right to an appeal is 
satisfied by a statutory trial de novo in a 
court of record, City of Monticello * 
Chrietensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990), 
its decision does not refute the standard 
rule that "appellate jurisdiction is the au-
thority to review the action or judgments 
of an inferior tribunal upon the record 
made in that tribunal and to affirm, modify 
or reverse." Peatrom * Board of 
CommH 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976); 
see also Christen***, 788 P^dat 520 (Dur-
ham, J., dissenting). Defendants requested 
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the district courts to review their bindover 
orders upon the record and requested the 
orders be reversed on the basis of insuffi-
ciency of the evidence. This review falls 
aquarely within the classic definition of an 
appeal. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court, 
in dicta, in State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 
264 (Utah 1985), characterized an attack on 
a bindover order as an appeal, stating: 
Section 77-35-2(bX3) provides that an ap-
peal may be taken by the defendant 
"[fjrom an interlocutory order when, 
upon petition for review, the supreme 
court decides that such an appeal would 
be in the interest of justice " That 
statute governs all appeals from bind-
over orders entered in any court 
Id at 270. 
In support of their position, defendants 
claim that Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure authorizes the district 
court to hear motions to quash bindover 
orders as part of its original jurisdiction in 
criminal cases. Rule 12(bXl) states: 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, 
including request for rulings on the ad-
missibility of evidence, which is capable 
of determination without the trial of the 
general issue may be raised prior to trial 
by written motion. The following shall 
be raised at least five days prior to the 
trial: 
(1) defenses and objections based on 
defects in the indictment or informa-
tion other than that it fails to show 
jurisdiction in the court or to charge an 
offense, which objection shall be no-
ticed by the court at any time during 
the pendency of the proceeding; 
Defendants read too much into Rule 12. 
In their motions to quash the bindover or-
ders, defendants did not object to defects in 
the informations. Rather, they objected to 
the orders of the circuit courts binding 
1. Defendants cite State v. Brickey, 714 V2d 644 
(Utah 1986), for the proposition that the district 
court has original jurisdiction to review bind-
over orders of the circuit court. In Brickey, 
after describing the circumstances allowing a 
refiling of an information and finding that those 
circumstances were not present, the court con-
cluded, "the district court should have quashed 
Hiem over for trial. Rule 12(bXl) governs 
objections to the information itself, not ob-
jections to an order of the circuit court 
finding that there was sufficient evidence 
presented in the preliminary hearing to 
support a finding of probable cause.1 
Defendants also rely on Rule 10(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, claiming 
it requires the district court to dispose of 
all objections relating to the preliminary 
bearing during the exercise of the district 
court's original criminal jurisdiction. Rule 
10(c) states: 
Any defect or irregularity in or want 
or absence of any proceeding provided 
for by statute or these rules prior to 
arraignment shall be specifically and ex-
pressly objected to before a plea of 
guilty is entered or the same is waived. 
We read Rule 10(c) to merely reaffirm 
the general legal rule that all objections, 
including those to proceedings in the circuit 
court, must be made before a guilty plea is 
entered or the objections will be waived. 
We are not dealing with the entry of a 
guilty plea in these appeals and thus do not 
find Rule 10(c) relevant to our analysis. 
We are not persuaded by defendants' 
attempts to demonstrate that their motions 
to quash the bindover orders invoked the 
district courts' original criminal jurisdic-
tion. Rather, we agree with the district 
courts that defendants seek a review of the 
substantive merits of the bindover orders 
on the record, a review more accurately 
characterized as an appeal. 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
[2,3] Alternatively, defendants argue 
that even if we characterize defendants' 
requests for review of the legality of the 
bindover orders as appeals, the district 
court has jurisdiction. 
the bindover." Mat 648. However, defendants 
concede that the statutory and constitutional 
changes limiting the district courts' appellate 
jurisdiction over the circuit courts occurred in 
July 1986, six months after Brickey was decided. 
Thus, the language referred to in Brickey is not 
helpful in our resolution of this issue. 
STATE v. 
Cite at 794 Md 
Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Con-
stitution provides: "The district court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction as provided by 
statute." Utah Const art VIII, § 5. Un-
like its 1896 predecessor which provided 
that a district court had "appellate jurisdic-
tion from all inferior courts and tribunals, 
and supervisory control of the same,"l ar-
ticle VIII, section 5 now limits the district 
courts' appellate jurisdiction to only that 
specifically provided for by statute. De-
Bry v. Salt Lake County BcL of Appeals, 
764 P.2d 627, 627 (Utah CtApp.1988).* 
The only reference to the appellate juris-
diction of the district court states: "The 
district court has jurisdiction to review 
agency adjudicative proceedings as set 
forth in Chapter 46b, Title 6 3 . . . . " 4 Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3-4(5) (1989). The district 
court's jurisdiction over agency adjudica-
tive proceedings is further limited by Utah 
Code Ann. § 6&-46b-15 (1989) to only inform 
mal adjudicative proceedings. Thus, the 
only appellate jurisdiction statutorily del-
egated to the district court is to review 
informal agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Under the current statutory scheme, the 
legislature has vested appellate jurisdiction 
2. Utah Const art. VIII, § 7 (1953). 
3. The Utah Supreme Court recently reinforced 
the principle that the district court's appellate 
jurisdiction must be conferred by statute: 
Article VIII, section 5 clearly provides that 
"the district court shall have appellate juris-
diction as provided by statute" and that "the 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original 
and appellate, shall be provided by statute." 
This language is plain and unambiguous. 
City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 
518 (Utah 1990). 
4. Prior to 1986, Utah Code Ann. § 7*-3-4 (1953) 
provided, in pertinent part: The district court 
shall have original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Constitu-
tion and not prohibited by law; appellate juris* 
diction from all inferior courts and tribunals, 
and a supervisory control over the same." 
5. Also relevant is Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-11 
(1987), which states in pertinent part, with our 
emphasis, that: "Except as otherwise directed 
by § 78-2-2, appeals from final civil and crimi-
nal judgments of the circuit courts are to the 
Court of Appeals." 
6. A magistrate is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-1-3(4) (1990) as *a justice of the Supreme 
HUMPHREY Utah 499 
49*(Uta*App. 19*0) 
over circuit court proceedings in the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Utah Code Aifn. 
§ 78-2a-3(2Xd) (1989) reads: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of in-
terlocutory appeals, over. 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, 
except those from the small claims de-
partment of a circuit court9 
Defendants argue that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2Xd) (1989) does not vest exclu-
sive jurisdiction over appeals from the cir-
cuit court in the Utah Court of Appeals. 
We agree, but do not understand how this 
helps defendants. Defendants must still 
point to some statutory delegation of appel-
late jurisdiction to the district court City 
of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 
518 (Utah 1990). 
Next, defendants correctly point out that 
the circuit courts were sitting as magis-
trates, not in their normal jurisdictional 
capacity, when they entered the bindover 
orders.4 Defendants argue that when the 
circuit court acts as a magistrate under 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure,7 the bindover order is not a normal 
Court, a judge of the district courts, a judge of 
the juvenile courts, a judge of the circuit courts 
and a justice of the peace or a judge of any 
court created by law." The Utah Supreme 
Court in Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1977), held that a circuit court conducting 
a preliminary hearing is not acting as a circuit 
court but as a magistrate. The court explained: 
A preliminary examination does not invoke 
the jurisdiction of the court In such a pro-
ceeding* the action is not action by a judge of 
any court, but that of a magistrate, a distinct 
statutory office. Justices of the Supreme 
Court, district judges, city court judges, and 
justices of the peace, when sitting as magis-
trates having the jurisdiction and powers con-
ferred by law upon magistrates and not those 
that pertain to their respective judicial offices. 
Id at 1327. 
7. Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure provides, in pertinent part 
(8Kb) If from the evidence a magistrate finds 
probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the de-
fendant has committed it, the magistrate shall 
order, in writing, that the defendant be bound 
over in the district court.... 
(c) If the magistrate does not find probable 
cause to believe that the crime charged has 
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judgment or order of the circuit court 
They, therefore, reason that this is an ex-
ception to the general delegation of appel-
late jurisdiction over circuit court orders to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Again, we do not disagree with the de-
fendants' argument in the abstract, but 
cannot decipher how the argument helps 
them. Defendants st31 point to no statute 
giving the district court jurisdiction over 
appeals from the decisions of a magistrate 
under Rule 7. In fact, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-S(2Xe) (1989) vests "interlocutory 
appeals from any court of record in crimi-
nal cases, except those involving a first 
degree or capital felony" in the Utah Court 
of Appeals. Certainly the magistrate was 
acting as a court of record in a criminal 
case when it held the preliminary hearing. 
Finally, both defendants make a number 
of policy arguments in favor of giving the 
district courts jurisdiction over objections 
to bindover orders alleging insufficiency of 
the evidence. Although some of their con-
tentions have merit,8 such arguments must 
be made to the legislature. It is the legis-
lature which is charged with the task of 
statutorily delegating appellate jurisdiction 
and we cannot modify its decisions because 
we believe policy considerations so dictate. 
In conclusion, we affirm the orders of 
the district courts refusing to exercise jur-
isdiction. 
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
been committed or that the defendant com-
mitted it, the magistrate shall dismiss the in-
formation and discharge the defendant The 
magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and an order of dismissal. The 
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the 
state from instituting a subsequent prosecu-
tion for the same offense. 
Bruno D'ASTON, Plaintiff 
And Appellee, 
• . 
Dorothy D'ASTON, et a!., Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 8W050-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 14, 1990. 
Action was brought for divorce. The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd 
L. Park, J., entered decree of divorce, and 
wife appealed, challenging property distri-
bution. The Court of Appeals, 790 P.2d 
590, ordered wife to submit herself to pro-
cess of lower court within SO days or her 
appeal would be dismissed. After wife 
gave notice of compliance with order, mer-
its of appeal were addressed. The Court of 
Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) post-
nuptial agreement not made in contempla-
tion of divorce was enforceable, absent 
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure, 
and (2) postnuptial agreement unambig-
uously provided that it would apply to dis-
position of spouses' property in event of 
divorce. I 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Husband and Wife <*»30 
Prenuptial agreements are enforceable 
as long as there is no fraud, coercion, or 
material nondisclosure. 
2. Husband and Wife <*=»30 
Postnuptial agreement not in contem-
plation of divorce is enforceable absent 
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure. 
3. Husband and Wife «=>31(2) 
Normal rules of contract construction 
would be applied in resolving disagreement 
& Defendants correctly claim that because the 
decision to allow an interlocutory appeal is dis-
cretionary, defendants might be forced to go 
through an unnecessary trial if the right to file 
an interlocutory appeal of the bindover order is 
denied. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
VAUGHN HUMPHREY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890424-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from a district court 
order denying a motion to quash the circuit court bindover order. 
This Court granted a petition for permission to appeal. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
SS 77-35-26(2)(c) and 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
!• Does a district court have appellate jurisdiction 
to review the sufficiency of the evidence presented in the 
circuit court supporting the order binding the defendant over for 
trial? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of all relevant statutes, rules and 
constitutional provisions is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with 16 counts including 
one count of pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree 
felony; five counts of theft by deception, second degree 
felonies; five counts of false odometer statements, third degree 
felonies; and five counts of selling or transferring automobiles 
with altered odometers, third degree felonies, on March 17, 1989 
(R. 9-16). After a preliminary hearing which was held on May 4, 
1989, Circuit Court Judge Eleanor Van Sciver bound defendant over 
for trial on May 9, 1989 (R. 2). Defendant was arraigned on May 
19, 1989 before District Court Judge James S. Sawaya (R. 31). 
On May 26, 1989, defendant moved in the district court 
to quash the circuit court bindover order on the grounds that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause that 
defendant committed the crimes (R. 32-7). On June 16, 1989, 
Judge Sawaya denied the motion, stating that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the evidence 
presented at preliminary hearing, and continued the trial without 
date (T. 3, R. 50-3). 
On June 23, 1989, defendant petitioned this Court for 
permission to file an interlocutory appeal (R. 54-9). This Court 
granted interlocutory review on August 2, 1989 (R. 99). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
There are no additional facts other than those set 
forth in the Statement of the Case, above. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district courts do not have jurisdiction to review 
the evidence supporting the bindover orders of circuit courts. 
The statute previously providing the district courts with 
-2-
appellate and supervisory authority over the circuit courts was 
amended in 1986 and the authority was eliminated. Defendant 
should have filed an interlocutory appeal petition in this Court 
directly from the circuit court order rather than filing a motion 
to quash in the district court if he wished appellate review of 
the bindover order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURTS LACK JURISDICTION TO 
REVIEW THE ORDERS OF CIRCUIT COURTS. 
Defendant characterized his action in the district 
court as a motion to quash the bindover order. He argues that he 
was not seeking appellate review in the district court. 
Nonetheless, regardless of defendant's characterization, what 
defendant sought was review on the record from the circuit court 
of the sufficiency of the evidence presented to that court. He 
requested the district court to reverse the order of the circuit 
court based upon that review. See Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Quash the Bindover at R. 33-7. This type of on-the-
record review of the sufficiency of the evidence with the 
requested relief being reversal of the order reviewed can be 
nothing other than appellate review. The district court ruled 
that it lacked authority to review bindover orders of the circuit 
court and denied the motion to quash. This ruling was correct. 
Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution 
states: "The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as 
provided by statute." This provision was adopted in 1985 and 
markedly contrasts with its 1896 predecessor, which provided that 
a district court has Mappellate jurisdiction from all inferior 
courts and tribunals, and supervisory control of the same." 
Prior to 1986, Utah Code Ann. S 78-3-4(1) provided: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Constitution 
and not prohibited by law; appellate 
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and 
tribunals, and a supervisory control of the 
same. 
See 1986 Utah Laws ch. 47, § 50. In 1986, the jurisdiction of 
the district court was redefined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 
(Supp. 1989). Subsection (1) states: "The district court has 
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal . . 
The only reference to appellate jurisdiction is in subsection 
(5): "The district court has jurisdiction to review agency 
adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Chapter 46b, Title 63 . 
. .." Thus, the district court has no authority to review the 
orders of a circuit court under the only statute granting it 
appellate authority. This Court is vested with jurisdiction to 
review the orders of circuit courts in Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(d) (Supp. 1989). Accordingly, if defendant wished review of 
the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing, he should have filed a timely interlocutory appeal from 
the circuit court order. State v. Schreuderf 712 P.2d 264, 270 
(Utah 1985). As the Supreme Court held in Schreuder, Utah Code 
Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(c) (Supp. 1989), governs appeals from bindover 
orders of circuit courts and grants a defendant the right to 
petition for an interlocutory appeal from the order. 
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Defendant cites State v, Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 
1986), for the proposition that the district court has 
jurisdiction to review bindover orders of the circuit court. 
Defendant fails to note that the amendment of the statute 
previously granting the district court appellate jurisdiction 
over circuit courts, which limits its appellate jurisdiction to 
agency adjudicative proceedings, occurred in 1986. The amendment 
was effective July 1, 1986. 1986 Utah Laws ch. 47, § 82. 
Brickey was decided on January 24, 1986, nearly 6 months prior to 
the effective date of the amendment. At that time, the statute 
governing the district court's appellate jurisdiction did allow 
the district court to exercise supervisory and appellate 
authority over the circuit courts. See 1986 Utah Laws Ch. 47 § 
50. The statute no longer vests such authority in the district 
court and Brickey no longer applies. To the extent that this 
Court's statement in State v. Martinez, Case No. 860255-CA, slip 
op. at 3 (Utah Ct. App. Feb. 18, 1988) (unpublished opinion), 
that Brickey recognizes an appellate authority in the district 
court is inconsistent with the district court's current statutory 
authority, it should not be followed. 
Defendant asserts that the district court has original 
jurisdiction to hear the motion to quash a circuit court bindover 
It is unclear what precedential value can be 
attributed to an unpublished opinion, thus, the use of the phrase 
"should not be followed." If this Court believes it would be 
more appropriate to overrule Martinez on this point, then the 
State requests the Court to do so. 
-*_ 
order. Thus, he contends that the district court could review 
the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing. This assertion relies upon defendant's mis-
characterization of the review he sought as something other than 
appellate review. As stated more fully above, what defendant 
sought from the district court was review of the circuit court 
record and a determination by the district court that the record 
was insufficient to support the order. This is nothing other 
than appellate review. Section 78-3-4 and art. VIII, § 5 both 
speak of original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction as 
separate classes of jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction is the 
authority of a court to hear matters originally filed in that 
court. Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a court to 
review orders of other tribunals. By simply characterizing his 
motion as an original action in the district court, defendant 
cannot transform appellate review into something that is included 
in the district court's original jurisdictional authority. If 
this were possible, anyone could characterize anything in a way 
in which they could obtain a hearing in the court of their choice 
rather than in the court that is designated to hear the matter. 
Cf. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (constitutional grant of general appellate 
jurisdiction does not grant specific appellate jurisdiction where 
there is no statutory appellate authority over the tribunal 
appealed from). 
Defendant also refers to Utah R. Crim. P. 12 for the 
district court's authority to quash bindovers. Defendant 
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correctly states that the district court can dismiss a criminal 
action where there are defects in the indictment or information; 
however, he reads too much into the Rule 12 provision. Rule 12 
states: 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, 
including request for rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence, which is capable 
of determination without the trial of the 
general issue may be raised prior to trial by 
written motion. The following shall be 
raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(1) Defenses and objections based on defects 
in the indictment or information other than 
that it fails to show jurisdiction in the 
court or to charge an offense, which 
objection shall be noticed by the court at 
any time during the pendency of the 
proceeding; . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(b)(1) (1982, repealed effective July 1, 
1990). Defendant's reliance on this rule is misplaced because he 
was not objecting to any defects in the information. Rather, he 
objected to the order of the circuit court binding him over for 
trial. Rule 12(b)(1) governs objections to the information 
itself and not objections to an order of the circuit court. The 
rule does not create an appellate authority in the district court 
that otherwise does not exist. 
In Point II of his brief, defendant argues that this 
Court should place appellate review of bindover orders in the 
hands of the district court in the interest of judicial economy. 
Not only are defendant's arguments weak, but they encourage this 
Court to make a policy decision that may only be made by the 
Legislature* 
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Defendant asserts that the district court could more 
quickly dispose of the issue of whether a bindover was supported 
by sufficient evidence than could this Court. He asserts that 
Rule 12 governs such a review and that he is required to raise 
the issue at least five days prior to trial. He argues, 
therefore, that the district court would necessarily decide the 
issue during the five days prior to trial and that this process 
would be much faster than interlocutory review. 
There are several flaws in defendant's scheme of 
review. First, defendant's assertion that the district court 
would review the case much more quickly is not necessarily 
accurate. Defendant's review scheme is attached to the trial 
date — a date that, for many reasons, may be continued 
repeatedly. A criminal trial is rarely set so soon after a 
bindover that a motion to quash based upon insufficient evidence 
would be disposed of sooner than this Court could hear an 
interlocutory appeal. Under defendant's scheme, a defendant's 
motion to quash could be filed five days prior to trial even if 
the trial date was not scheduled until several months after the 
preliminary hearing and bindover. 
Further, by filing his request for review as a motion 
to quash in the district court, defendant creates for himself the 
ability to file an interlocutory appeal petition from an adverse 
ruling of the district court. Instead of creating a more 
efficient system of review, defendant creates a system in which 
he hopes to obtain two separate reviews of the same issue. 
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An interlocutory appeal petition, on the other hand, is 
attached to the order appealed from. A petition for permission 
to appeal must be filed within 20 days from the order appealed 
from. See State v. Tiffany, Case no. 890595-CA (order filed Jan. 
4, 1990). This date is much more predictable than one which is 
tied to an uncertain trial date which is dependant upon court 
scheduling and any other proceedings that might be required prior 
to trial, such as competency evaluations, motions to suppress 
evidence, etc. 
Second, defendant assumes that the district court could 
review the record of the preliminary hearing during the five days 
prior to trial. This assumption is unrealistic. Because the 
district court's primary function is to hear trials, it would be 
required to fit the review of a bindover order into its already 
overcrowded trial schedule. The court might be required to read 
several volumes of transcript from the preliminary hearing to 
properly evaluate a defendant's claim of insufficient evidence. 
Such a review requires time, thus, a five-day expectation is 
impractical. 
Third, defendant asserts that this Court's review 
process would be even further delayed because this Court must 
determine whether to accept the appeal and then the case would 
follow the normal schedule for preparation of transcripts and 
briefing which he asserts is too lengthy. This problem, if it 
exists, is easily rectified. This Court could treat criminal 
interlocutory appeals with expedition and could require the 
parties to adhere to an expedited briefing schedule. This Court 
need not grant extensions for preparation of briefs. 
Moreover, defendant cannot seriously be suggesting that 
the preparation of transcripts for this Court's review would 
require any more time than would the preparation of transcripts 
for the district court's review. Nor can he seriously be 
suggesting that a district court could review the sufficiency of 
the evidence presented to another court without reviewing the 
record that was created in that court. This Court's primary 
function is appellate review of the records created in lower 
courts. This Court is well-equipped to perform that function. 
There is no need for a criminal trial to be delayed by this Court 
any longer than it would be delayed by the district court for 
consideration of the same issue. 
Even though defendant asserts that this Court is unable 
to review the bindover order as skillfully as the district court, 
this Court is well-equipped to review the sufficiency of the 
evidence that has been presented to a lower tribunal. Indeed, 
this Court is frequently called upon to review the sufficiency of 
the evidence in criminal cases. Defendant's assertion that the 
trial court is better able to review fact intensive issues misses 
the mark because this assertion would only be valid if the 
district court heard additional evidence. Of course, neither the 
State nor the defendant could claim that a circuit court order 
should stand or fall based upon evidence that was not presented 
to the circuit court. Thus, defendant's argument is baseless. 
Finally, even if this Court thought that policy 
considerations dictated that the district court is the 
appropriate forum for appellate review of circuit court bindover 
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orders, this Court has no authority to place jurisdiction in the 
district court. Article VIII, S 5 authorizes the district courts 
to exercise appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. There 
is no statutory authority for district courts to review the 
orders of circuit courts. For this reason, the district court 
correctly denied defendant's motion to quash the bindover order, 
and this Court should affirm the district court's order. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm the district court's order denying defendant's motion 
to quash the circuit court order binding him over for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3* day of January, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L^S^OQREIT 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
Vaughn Humphrey, Case No. 890424-CA 
Harry Jamar Gordan, : 890130-CA 
and Bruce Mathews 890666-CA 
Defendants/Appellants. Priority No. 13 
• 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals misconstrue statutes, 
constitutional provisions, and decisions of this Court in 
determining that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over 
quashal of preliminary hearing bindover orders and that the 
district courts do not? 
OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Copies of the Court of Appeals1 decisions and the order 
denying rehearing are included in Appendix 1. 
JURISDICTION OF UTAH SUPREME COURT 
These three cases came separately before the Court of 
Appeals as interlocutory appeals on the sole issue of district 
court jurisdiction over preliminary hearing bindover orders. 
The Court of Appeals consolidated the Humphrey and 
Gordan cases in an opinion filed June 14, 1990. The Court of 
Appeals issued a separate opinion in the Mathews case, which was 
filed on June 21, 1990. The Court of Appeals consolidated the 
three cases in its order denying rehearing filed August 15, 1990. 
1 
This Court is granted statutory jurisdiction over 
petitions for writs of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals by 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(5), and is also vested with common 
law power to issue the writs. Utah Constitution, Article VIII, 
section 3.2 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutory and constitutional provisions 
are provided in full, either in the body of the petition, or in 
Appendix 2: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, section 12 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 1 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 3 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 4 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 5 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-3(4) 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-1-1 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-1-2 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(5) 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(e) 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(8) (b) and (c) 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(c) 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1) 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(2)(c) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
In each of these cases the Appellants were bound over 
to district courts, in which courts they moved to quash the 
bindover orders issued by the magistrates. The district courts 
1 See Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 (listing 
examples circumstances in which this Court might exercise its 
discretion in granting the writ). 
2 See Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 42-43 (Utah 
1981)(discussing breadth of common law powers). 
2 
ruled that they had no jurisdiction over the bindover orders 
issued by the magistrates. 
The Utah Court of Appeals allowed interlocutory appeals 
of the district court rulings indicating that the district 
courts have no jurisdiction to quash bindover orders. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed the district court rulings, holding that (1) 
the district courts have no appellate jurisdiction over 
magistratesf and the Court of Appeals' interlocutory appeal 
jurisdiction is the appropriate avenue for disposition of motions 
3 
to quash bindover orders following preliminary hearings; and (2) 
bindover quashal is an appellate function that must occur in the 
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, rather than during the 
district court's exercise of original jurisdiction. 
B. FACTS 
These cases have not yet gone to trial. There are no 
facts pertinent to the legal issue addressed by the Court of 
Appeals and currently before this Court. 
REASONS WHY QUESTIONS PRESENTED JUSTIFY ISSUANCE OF WRIT 
This Court should grant certiorari in these cases 
because the Court of Appeals misconstrued statutes, 
constitutional provisions, and decisions of this Court in 
reaching the conclusion that bindover quashal cannot be performed 
by district courts, and must be disposed of through interlocutory 
3 State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496, 498-500 (Utah App. 
1990). 
4 State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496, 497-498 (Utah App. 1990). 
3 
appeal. See Monson v. Hall, 584 P.2d 833, 835 (Utah 1978)("One 
of the cardinal rules of statutory construction requires 
construction with the objective of bringing consonance to 
Constitutional and statutory provisions, which will be congruous 
with expressed intent, and the applicability of the law in 
general•"). 
This jurisdictional question is an important question 
of Utah law that should be decided by this Court, which is vested 
with the power to regulate procedure in the courts of this 
state. 
A. IN HOLDING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION OVER 
BINDOVER QUASHAL, THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE 
STATUTES AND A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION GOVERNING THE ISSUE, 
WHICH STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INDICATE THAT THE 
COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER BINDOVER ORDERS. 
In the Humphrey opinion, the court acknowledged that 
under this Court's opinion in Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1977), the magistrate issuing the bindover order was not 
acting as a circuit court. The Court of Appeals then proceeded 
5 Article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution 
provides this Court's rule making authority. 
6 The Humphrey opinion states, 
A magistrate is defined in Utah Code 
Ann. section 77-1-3(4)(1990) as " a justice 
of the Supreme Court, a judge of the district 
courts, a judge of the juvenile courts, a 
judge of the circuit courts and a justice of 
the peace or a judge of any court created by 
law." The Utah Supreme Court in Van Dam v. 
Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1988), held that 
a circuit court conducting a preliminary 
hearing is not acting as a circuit court but 
as a magistrate. The court explained: 
A preliminary examination does 
not invoke the jurisdiction of the 
4 
to find that in issuing the bindover order, the magistrate was 
acting as a court of record, stating, 
In fact# Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1989) vests "interlocutory appeals from any 
court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a first degree or capital 
felony" in the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Certainly the magistrate was acting as a 
court of record in a criminal case when it 
neiq tne preliminary nearing. 
Humphrey at 500 (emphasis added). 
This conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the 
magistrate was certainly acting as a court of record conflicts 
with Utah statutory and constitutional law. Utah Code Ann. 
sections 78-1-1 and 78-l-2# which constitute the statutory 
enumeration of courts of record, do not indicate that 
o 
magistrates are courts of record. 
court. In such a proceeding, the 
action is not action by a judge or 
any court, but that of a 
magistrate, a distinct statutory 
office. Justices of the Supreme 
Court, district judges, city court 
judges, and justices of the peace, 
when sitting as magistrates having 
the jurisdiction and powers 
conferred by law upon magistrates 
and not those that pertain to their 
respective judicial offices. 
Id. at 1327. 
Humphrey page 499 n.6. See also discussion in body of text at 
499-500. 
7 Article VIII section 1 of the Utah Constitution vests 
the legislature with the power to enumerate courts of record. 
8 Section 78-1-1 provides, 
The following are the courts of justice in 
this state: 
(1) the Supreme Court; 
(2) the Court of Appeals 
5 
The Utah Court of Appeals was incorrect in finding that 
its interlocutory appeal jurisdiction is the appropriate avenue 
for motions to quash improper bindover orders. The Court of 
Appeals in fact has no appellate jurisdiction over the 
magistrates' bindover orders. See Constitution of Utah Article 
VIII section 5 and Debry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, 
764 P.2d 627, 628 (Utah App. 1988)(Utah Court of Appeals has no 
appellate jurisdiction unless it is specifically provided for by 
statute); Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3 (describing the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals). 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION THAT BINDOVER QUASHAL MUST BE 
TREATED AS AN APPEAL CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH GOVERNING 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND IS AN UNDULY RIGID 
INTERPRETATION OF THIS COURT'S DECISIONS. 
1. Constitutional Provisions and Statutes 
It is unclear whether the Court of Appeals agreed that 
if bindover quashal is characterized as an appeal, it must be 
available as a matter of right. In a rather perplexing footnote, 
the court stated: 
Defendants correctly claim that because 
the decision to allow an interlocutory appeal 
is discretionary, defendants might be forced 
(3) the district courts; 
(4) the circuit courts; 
(5) the juvenile courts; and 
(6) the justices' courts. 
Section 78-1-2 provides, 
The courts enumerated in the first five 
subdivisions [subsections] of the preceding 
section [section 78-1-1] are courts of 
record. 
6 
to go through an unnecessary trial if the 
right to file an interlocutory appeal of the 
bindover is denied* 
Id. at 500 n. 8 (emphasis added). 
Under Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution, 
the accused has "the right to appeal in all cases." Article VIII 
section 5 of the Utah Constitution reiterates the mandatory 
nature of the right to "appeal" the bindover order if the order 
is characterized as an appeal. It states, in part, "Except for 
matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be 
in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original 
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the 
cause." 
Despite the mandatory nature of appeals under these 
constitutional provisions, however, the Court of Appeals found 
that the appropriate jurisdictional provision for disposition of 
bindover orders was the court's interlocutory appeal provision. 
Humphrey at 500. As the Court of Appeals footnote 8 seems to 
acknowledge, interlocutory appeals are not appeals of right, but 
are discretionary with the court. See also Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 5(e) and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
26(2)(c) (making interlocutory appeals discretionary with the 
court). 
The Court of Appeals' intimation that the right to 
appeal an improper bindover order might be salvaged after an 
"unnecessary trial if the right to file an interlocutory appeal 
of the bindover order is denied" fails to recognize that pre-
7 
trial errors are generally considered cured and mooted by 
trials, in which the full panoply of constitutional rights apply. 
See Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1). Cf. State v. 
Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 808 (Utah App. 1988)(defective arrest 
warrant does not void subsequent conviction), citing State v. 
Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 271-272 (Utah 1985)(same); and Gerstein 
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 125 (1975)(absence of pretrial 
determination of probable cause to detain without an arrest 
warrant does not void a subsequent conviction). 
2. Case law 
Rejecting the assertion that bindover quashal may occur 
during the district courts' exercise of unlimited original 
9 jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals insisted that bindover 
quashal must be characterized as an appeal. The court quoted the 
definition of "appeal" in Peatross v. Board of Comm'rs, 555 P.2d 
281 (Utah 1976), 
[A]ppellate jurisdiction is the authority to 
review the action or judgments of an inferior 
tribunal upon the record made in that 
tribunal and to affirm, modify or reverse. 
Humphrey at 497, quoting Peatross at 284. The court then found 
that bindover quashal "falls squarely within the classic 
definition of an appeal." Humphrey at 498. 
9 Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution 
provides in part. 
The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited 
by this constitution or by statute, and power 
to issue all extraordinary writs. 
There is neither constitutional nor statutory limitation on this 
original jurisdiction. Humphrey at 497. 
8 
This reasoning of the Court of Appeals is unduly rigid, 
particularly when Peatross is examined. While Peatross v. Board 
of Comm'rs, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976) does state the general 
definition of "appeal", the general rule is dicta in Peatross* 
The Court of Appeals1 reading of Peatross as requiring 
all appeal-like proceedings to be channeled through the 
appellate process is particularly anomalous in view of the 
actions of the Peatross court. There, the court recognized that 
the plaintiff had some right to review of the administrative 
decision revoking her business license, and found that her right 
could be satisfied through the district court's extraordinary 
writ powers. JLd. at 283-284. The court explicitly noted that in 
performing this review, the district court was not limited to 
conducting the proceedings in the traditional appellate fashion, 
and could receive evidence if necessary. Ici. at 284. It seems 
that ather than standing for rigid procedural rules, Peatross 
exemplifies a workable approach to classification of judicial 
• 
10 Peatross involved an appeal from a district court order 
denying a petition for trial de novo after an administrative 
hearing, and directing the plaintiff to proceed by extraordinary 
writ in the district court. Prior to proceeding to its analysis, 
the court explicitly noted the scope of its holding, "Inasmuch as 
that is the only order the district court has entered in this 
case, it is the only appealable order; and therefore the 
challenge to its propriety is the only matter we are directly 
concerned with on this appeal." j[d. at 283. 
11 See also Debry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, 
764 P.2d 627, 628 n. 3 (Utah App. 1988)(after Utah Court of 
Appeals determined it had no statutory appellate jurisdiction, it 
did note that judicial review could still be obtained through 
extraordinary writ). 
9 
procedures. 
Even if the Peatross definition of "appeal" were 
correctly interpreted as mandating appellate procedure in all 
12 . 
cases resembling the definition of appeal, it does not appear 
that bindover quashal fits the definition. "The standard rule is 
that appellate jurisdiction is the authority to review the 
actions or judgments of an inferior tribunal upon the record made 
in that tribunal, and to affirm, modify or reverse such action or 
judgment." Peatross at 284 (emphasis added). There is nothing 
to support the assumption that the unique jurisdiction of 
magistrate is "inferior" to the jurisdiction of the district 
court or the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. See Utah Code 
Ann. section 77-1-3(4) (indicating that a Justice of this Court 
may exercise the jurisdiction of the magistrate). 
The Court of Appeals' concession that it relies on 
dicta in State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), deserves 
13 further explanation. Mr. Schreuder1s contention before this 
12 Motions to quash bindover orders are not the only 
appeal-like functions that are performed regularly by the 
district courts in the absence of a specific statutory grant of 
appellate jurisdiction. For example, petitions for writs of 
habeas corpus, review of orders dismissing informations for 
insufficient evidence (which district courts perform when the 
informations are refiled), see State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 
(Utah 1986), and review of the issuance of search and arrest 
warrants, may fall within the general description of an appeal. 
13 The Court of Appeals1 discussion of Schreuder is as 
follows: 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court, in dicta, in 
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), 
characterized an attack on a bindover order as an 
appeal, stating: 
Section 77-35-2(b)(3) provides that 
10 
Court was that because his preliminary hearing occurred in the 
district/ rather than circuit court, he was deprived of equal 
protection of the law when he could not obtain the usual district 
court review of bindover orders. Schreuder at 270. This Court 
found that Mr. Schreuder1s right to review of the bindover order 
was protected by this Court's interlocutory appeal provision. 
Id. 
The Court of Appeals' citations to City of Monticello 
v. Christensen# 788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990), provide no support for 
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that bindover quashal must be 
treated as an appeal, beyond pointing to another quotation of the 
Peatross definition of an appeal. Humphrey at 497 (discussing 
Christensen in general, and finding it inapposite), and Humphrey 
at 497 (citing Justice Durham's dissent in Christensen, which 
quotes the Peatross definition). 
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE RULES 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DO NOT EVIDENCE DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION 
OVER BINDOVER QUASHAL. 
The Court of Appeals rejected the Appellants' 
assertions that the district court's jurisdiction over improper 
an appeal may be taken by the 
defendant n[f]rom an interlocutory 
order when, upon petition for 
review, the supreme court decides 
that such an appeal would be in the 
interest of justice. . . . " That 
statute governs all appeals from 
bindover orders entered in any 
court. 
Id. at 270. 
Humphrey at 497-498. 
11 
bindover orders (whether characterized as original or appellate)# 
is recognized in the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Rule 10(c) provides, 
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or 
want or absence of any proceeding provided 
for by statute or these rules prior to 
arraignments shall be specifically and 
expressly objected to before a plea of guilty 
is entered or the same is waived. 
The Court of Appeals declined to address the 
possibility that this statute might evidence district court 
jurisdiction over bindover quashal, finding the rule irrelevant 
because none of the three cases involved a guilty plea. Humphrey 
at 498. 
Given the Court of Appeals' duty to decide issues of 
law in a manner "bringing consonance to Constitutional and 
statutory provisions, which will be congruous with expressed 
intent# and the applicability of the law in general/1 Monson v. 
Hall, 584 P.2d 833, 835 (Utah 1978), the court should have 
considered Rule 10(c). 
Rule 12(b)(1) provides, in part, 
The following shall be raised at least five 
days prior to trial: 
(1) defenses and objections 
based on defects in the indictment 
or information other than that it 
fails to show jurisdiction in the 
court or to charge an offense, 
which objection shall be noticed by 
the court at any time during the 
proceeding[.] 
The Court of Appeals ruled that Rule 12 relates 
strictly to facial, rather than substantive, defects in 
12 
14 
informations. Humphrey at 498. There is nothing in the 
language of Rule 12 limiting the rule to facial defects, or even 
distinguishing between facial and substantive defects. Thus, the 
Court of Appeals' reading of Rule 12 appears unfounded. See also 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(8) (b) and (c) (to proceed 
properly to the district court, information must be supported by 
probable cause); State v. Smith, 617 P.2d 232 (Okl.Cr. 
1980)(affirming district court's "order quashing the information" 
based on insufficient evidence presented at preliminary hearing). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gordan, Mr. Humphrey, and Mr. Mathews request that 
this Court grant a writ of certiorari on question 1. 
Respectfully submitted this , 1990. 
fAMES Ag^BRADSHAW 
'Attorney for Mr. Gordan 
NANCY BERGESON 
Attorney for Mr.' Mathews 
14 The Court of Appeals asserted that "[i]n their motions 
to cjuash the bindover orders, defendants did not object to 
defects in the informations. Rather, they objected to the orders 
of the circuit courts binding them over for trial." Humphrey at 
499. Mr. Gordan (R. 58) and Mr. Mathews (R. 65-66) explicitly 
moved to quash the bindover order and dismiss the information, 
although it seems that the latter would follow the former 
naturally. 
13 
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APPENDIX 1 
OPINIONS AND ORDER DENYING REHEARING 
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the placement of the signs on specific sites 
which were the same locations occupied by 
the signs at the time the present parties 
executed the existing lease, and that the 
parties intended the lease to continue Rea-
gan's right to maintain the signs only in 
their existing locations. Although the evi-
dence is controverted, "we assume that the 
trial judge believed those aspects of the 
evidence and the inferences reasonably 
drawn from them that support his deci-
sion." Redevelopment Agency, 785 P.2d 
at 1122 (quoting Brixen & Christopher, 
Architects v. Elton, 111 P.2d 1039, 1042 
(Utah Ct.App.1989)). Under our standard 
of review, we will not set aside a trial 
court's findings unless they are against the 
clear weight of the evidence or we other-
wise reach a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made, Smith v. 
Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 
1224-1225 (Utah Ct.App.1990), and we give 
deference to the trial court's findings and 
its opportunity to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
Having examined the record, we con-
clude that the trial court's findings have 
adequate evidentiary support and are not 
clearly erroneous. We, therefore, affirm 
its judgment 
BILLINGS and ORME, JJ., concur. 
(p | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Vaughn HUMPHREY, Defendant 
and Appellant 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Harry Jamar GORDON, Defendant 
and Appellant 
Nos. 890424-CA, 89013O-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 14, 1990. 
Defendants charged with felonies chal-
lonoroH fMiwrit /»rmrf nrHprQ hinHinor thpTYi 
over for trial. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya and 
Frank G. Noel, JJ., declined to exercise 
jurisdiction, and defendants appealed. Ap-
peals were consolidated The Court of Ap-
peals, Billings, J., held that (1) defendants' 
requests for review of legality of bindover 
orders did not invoke district court's origi-
nal jurisdiction, but rather were more accu-
rately characterized as appeals, and (2) de-
fendants' requests were not within appel-
late jurisdiction of district court. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <S=>1004 
Defendants' motions to quash circuit 
court bindover orders did not invoke dis-
trict court's broad original jurisdiction, but 
rather were more accurately characterized 
as appeal, inasmuch as defendants sought 
review of substantive merits of bindover 
orders on records. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-
10(c), 77-35-12(bXl); Const Art 8, § 5. 
2. Criminal Law «=*1018 
District court's appellate jurisdiction 
must be conferred by statute. Const Art 
8, § 5. 
3. Criminal Law <&=»1018 
District court did not have appellate 
jurisdiction over defendant's challenge to 
circuit court orders binding defendants 
over for trial, in absence of any statutory 
delegation of appellate jurisdiction to dis-
trict court; legislature vested appellate jur-
isdiction over circuit court proceedings in 
Court of Appeals. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-15: 
77-35-7, 78-2a-3(2Xd), 78-3-4(5). 
Elizabeth Bowman, Elizabeth Holbrook 
(argued), Salt Lake City, Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Ass'n, for defendant and appel-
lant, Humphrey. 
'James C. Bradshaw, Elizabeth Holbrook 
(argued), Salt Lake City, Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Ass'n, for defendant and appel-
lant Gordon 
STATE v. HUMPHREY Utah 497 
Cite as 794 VJA 496 (UtahApp. 1990) 
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Sandra To resolve this jurisdictional question, we 
Sjogren (argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt review the recent constitutional and statu-
t e City, for plaintiff and appellee the tory changes in the jurisdiction of the dis-
5tate. trict courts and the contemporaneous provi-
sions which created the Utah Court of Ap-
OPINION peals. As such, we are faced with an issue 
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and of first impression. 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
We have consolidated two criminal, inter-
ocutory appeals for decision as they 
>resent the identical legal issue. Appel-
ants Vaughn Humphrey ("Humphrey") 
md Harry Jamar Gordon ("Gordon") ap-
>eal from two separate decisions of a dis-
rict court wherein the trial judge conclud-
ed the district court did not have jurisdic-
ion to review defendants' bindover orders 
rom circuit court. We affirm. 
Humphrey was charged with sixteen sec-
ond or third degree felonies. Gordon was 
harged with manslaughter, a second de-
cree felony. In both cases, the circuit 
ourt held preliminary hearings and bound 
lefendants over for trial. Both defendants 
vere ultimately arraigned before the dis-
rict court 
Subsequently, Humphrey and Gordon 
ach filed a "motion to quash" his respec-
ive bindover in district court, alleging the 
tate had failed to establish probable cause 
hat he had committed the crimes with 
fhich he was charged. In response, the 
tate argued the district court had no juris-
iction to consider defendants' motions. 
Tie district courts concluded defendants 
rare, in substance, seeking an appellate 
eview on the record of the circuit courts' 
indover orders and that jurisdiction of 
hese interlocutory appeals was vested in 
tie Utah Court of Appeals, not the district 
ourt. Humphrey and Gordon then filed 
tiese interlocutory appeals. 
This consolidated opinion requires us to 
etermine whether the district courts prop-
rly declined to exercise jurisdiction. This 
resents a question of law and thus we 
ccord no deference to the trial courts' 
inclusions, but review them under a "cor-
ectness" standard. City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990). 
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 
[1] Initially, defendants argue their mo-
tions to quash their bindover orders _ in-
voked the district court's original jurisdic-
tion. 
Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Con-
stitution currently provides, in pertinent 
part 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters except as limit-
ed by this constitution or by statute, and 
power to issue all extraordinary writs. 
Utah Const a r t VIII, § 5. 
The district courts are given broad origi-
nal jurisdiction by the Utah Constitution 
limited only by specific constitutional or 
statutory provisions. Statutory reference 
to the district court's original jurisdiction 
does not limit its broad jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1989) pro-
vides: "The district court has original juris-
diction in all matters civil and crimi-
na l . . . . " Id. at § 78-3-4(1). We disagree 
that the defendants' motions to quash their 
bindover orders invoked the original juris-
diction of the district courts. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently dealt 
with the issue of what constitutes an ap-
peal. Although the supreme court held 
that the constitutional right to an appeal is 
satisfied by a statutory trial de novo in a 
court of record, City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990), 
its decision does not refute the standard 
rule that "appellate jurisdiction is the au-
thority to review the action or judgments 
of an inferior tribunal upon the record 
made in that tribunal and to affirm, modify 
or reverse." Peatross v. Board of 
Comm'rs, 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976); 
see also Christensen, 788 P.2d at 520 (Dur-
ham, J., dissenting). Defendants requested 
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the district courts to review their bindover 
orders upon the record and requested the 
orders be reversed on the basis of insuffi-
ciency of the evidence. This review falls 
sguarely within the classic definition of an 
appeal 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court, 
in dicta, in State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 
264 (Utah 1985), characterized an attack on 
a bindover order as an appeal, stating: 
Section 77-35-2(b)(3) provides that an ap-
peal may be taken by the defendant 
"[fjrom an interlocutory order when, 
upon petition for review, the supreme 
court decides that such an appeal would 
be in the interest of justice " That 
statute governs all appeals from bind-
over orders entered in any court. 
Id at 270. 
In support of their position, defendants 
claim that Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of 
Cnmmaf Procedure authorizes the district 
court to hear motions to quash bindover 
orders as part of its original jurisdiction in 
criminal cases. Rule 12(b)(1) states: 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, 
including request for rulings on the ad-
missibility of evidence, which is capable 
of determination without the trial of the 
general issue may be raised prior to trial 
by written motion. The following shall 
be raised at least five days prior to the 
trial: 
(1) defenses and objections based on 
defects in the indictment or informa-
tion other than that it fails to show 
jurisdiction in the court or to charge an 
offense, which objection shall be no-
ticed by the coart at any time daring 
the pendency of the proceeding; 
Defendants read too much into Rule 12. 
In their motions to quash the bindover or-
ders, defendants did not object to defects in 
the informations. Rather, they objected to 
the orders of the circuit courts binding 
I. Defendants cite State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 
(Utah 1986), for the proposition that the district 
court has original jurisdiction to review bind-
over orders of the circuit court In Brickey, 
after describing the circumstances allowing a 
refiling of an information and finding that those 
"circumstances were not present, the court con-
cluded, "the district court should have quashed 
them over for trial. Rule 12(b)(1) gover 
objections to the information itself, not "6! 
jections to an order of the circuit court! 
finding that there was sufficient evidence 
Presented in the preliminary hearing tg? 
Support a finding of probable cause.1 | j i 
Defendants also rely on Rule 10(c) of the' 
tltah Rules of Criminal Procedure, claiming 
*t requires the district court to dispose of 
*U objections relating to the preliminary 
Hearing during the exercise of the district 
Court's original criminal jurisdiction. Rule 
l0(c) states: 
Any defect or irregularity in or want 
or absence of any proceeding provided 
for by statute or these rules prior to 
arraignment shall be specifically and ex-
pressly objected to before a plea of 
guilty is entered or the same is waived. 
We read Rule 10(c) to merely reaffirm 
%he genera? legal rule that all objections, 
deluding those to proceedings in the circuit 
c0urt, must be made before a guilty plea is 
ehtered or the objections will be waived. 
We are not dealing with the entry of a 
Suilty plea in these appeals and thus do not 
$nd Rule 10(c) relevant to our analysis. 
We are not persuaded by defendants' 
attempts to demonstrate that their motions 
*0 quash the bindover orders invoked the 
^strict courts' original criminal jurisdic-
tion. Rather, we agree with the district 
c0urts that defendants seek a review of the 
s\ibstantive merits of the bindover orders 
°h- the record, a review more accurately 
characterized as an appeal. 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
[2,3] Alternatively, defendants argue 
^\at even if we characterize defendants' 
requests for review of the legality of the 
handover orders as appeals, the district 
C(
*urt has jurisdiction. 
the bindover." Id. at 648. However, defendants 
concede that the statutory and constitutional 
changes limiting the district courts' appellate 
jurisdiction over the circuit courts occurred in 
July 1986, six months after Brickey was decided. 
Thus, the language referred to in Brickey is not 
helpful in our resolution of this issue. 
O i i l i l j V . i H j i U i JLJLlvl^ JL 
Cite as 794 FM 496 
Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Con-
stitution provides: "The district court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction as provided by 
statute." Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5. Un-
like its 1896 predecessor which provided 
that a district court had "appellate jurisdic-
tion from all inferior courts and tribunals, 
and supervisory control of the same,"2 ar-
ticle VIII, section 5 now limits the district 
courts1 appellate jurisdiction to only that 
specifically provided for by statute. De-
Bry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 
764 P.2d 627, 627 (Utah Ct.App.1988).? 
The only reference to the appellate juris-
diction of the district court states:, "The 
district court has jurisdiction to review 
agency adjudicative proceedings as set 
forth in Chapter 46b, Title 6 3 . . . . " 4 Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3-4(5) (1989). The district 
court's jurisdiction over agency adjudica-
tive proceedings is further limited by Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (1989) to only infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings. Thus, the 
only appellate jurisdiction statutorily del-
egated to the district court is to review 
informal agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Under the current statutory scheme, the 
legislature has vested appellate jurisdiction 
2. Utah Const, art. VIII, § 7 (1953). 
3. The Utah Supreme Court recently reinforced 
the principle that the district court's appellate 
jurisdiction must be conferred by statute: 
Article VIII, section 5 clearly provides that 
"the district court shall have appellate juris-
diction as provided by statute" and that "the 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original 
and appellate, shall be provided by statute." 
This language is plain and unambiguous. 
City of Monticello v. Christensen. 788 P.2d 513. 
518 (Utah 1990). 
4. Prior to 1986, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953) 
provided, in pertinent part: The district court 
shall have original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Constitu-
tion and not prohibited by law; appellate juris-
diction from all inferior courts and.tribunals, 
and a supervisory control over the same." 
5. Also relevant is Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-11 
(1987), which states in pertinent part, with our 
emphasis, that: "Except as otherwise directed 
by § 78-2-2, appeals from final civil and crimi-
nal judgments of the circuit courts are to the 
Court of Appeals." 
6. A magistrate is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-1-3(4) (1990) as "a justice of the Supreme 
(UtahApp. 1990) 
over circuit court proceedings in the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1989) reads: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of in-
terlocutory appeals, over: 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, 
except those from the small claims de-
partment of a circuit court.5 
Defendants argue that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1989) does not vest exclu-
sive jurisdiction over appeals from the cir-
cuit court in the Utah Court of Appeals. 
We agree, but do not understand how this 
helps defendants. Defendants must still 
point to some statutory delegation of appel-
late jurisdiction to the district court. City 
of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 
518 (Utah 1990). 
Next, defendants correctly point out that 
the circuit courts were sitting as magis-
trates, not in their normal jurisdictional 
capacity, when they entered the bindover 
orders.6 Defendants argue that when the 
circuit court acts as a magistrate under 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure,7 the bindover order is not a normal 
Court, a judge of the district courts, a judge of 
the juvenile courts, a judge of the circuit courts 
and a justice of the peace or a judge of any 
court created by law." The Utah Supreme 
Court in Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1977), held that a circuit court conducting 
a preliminary hearing is not acting as a circuit 
court but as a magistrate. The court explained: 
A preliminary examination does not invoke 
the jurisdiction of the court. In such a pro-
ceeding, the action is not action by a judge of 
any court, but that of a magistrate, a distinct 
statutory office. Justices of the Supreme 
Court, district judges, city court judges, and 
justices of the peace, when sitting as magis-
trates having the jurisdiction and powers con-
ferred by law upon magistrates and not those 
that pertain to their respective judicial offices. 
Id at 1327. 
7. Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure provides, in pertinent part: 
(8)(b) If from the evidence a magistrate finds 
probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the de-
fendant has committed it, the magistrate shall 
order, in writing, that the defendant be bound 
over in the district court 
(c) If the magistrate does not find probable 
cause to believe that the crime charged has 
500 Utah 794 PACIFIC REF 
judgment or order of the circuit court. 
They, therefore, reason that this is an ex-
ception to the general delegation of appel-
late jurisdiction over circuit court orders to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Again, we do not disagree with the de-
fendants' argument in the abstract, but 
cannot decipher how the argument helps 
them/ Defendants still point to no statute 
giving the district court jurisdiction over 
appeals from the decisions of a magistrate 
under Rule 7. In fact, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2Xe) (1989) vests "interlocutory 
appeals from any court of record in crimi-
nal cases, except those involving a first 
degree or capital felony" in the Utah Court 
of Appeals. Certainly the magistrate was 
acting as a court of record in a criminal 
case when it held the preliminary hearing. 
Finally, both defendants make a number 
of policy arguments in favor of giving the 
district courts jurisdiction over objections 
to bindover orders alleging insufficiency of 
the evidence. Although some of their con-
tentions have merit,8 such arguments must 
be made to the legislature. It is the legis-
lature which is charged with the task of 
statutorily delegating appellate jurisdiction 
and we cannot modify its decisions because 
we believe policy considerations so dictate. 
In conclusion, we affirm the orders of 
the district courts refusing to exercise jur-
isdiction. 
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ , 
concur. 
been committed or that the defendant com-
mitted it, the magistrate shall dismiss the in-
formation and discharge the defendant The 
magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and an order of dismissal. The 
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the 
(state from instituting a subsequent prosecu-
tion for the same offense. 
IRTER, 2d SERIES 
Bruno D'ASTON, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Dorothy D'ASTON, et al., Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 890050-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 14, 1990. 
Action was brought for divorce. The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd 
L. Park, J., entered decree of divorce, and 
wife appealed, challenging property distri-
bution. The Court of Appeals, 790 P.2d 
590, ordered wife to submit herself to pro-
cess of lower court within 30 days or her 
appeal would be dismissed. After wife 
gave notice of compliance with order, mer-
its of appeal were addressed. The Court of 
Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) post-
nuptial agreement not made in contempla-
tion of divorce was enforceable, absent 
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure, 
and (2) postnuptial agreement unambig-
uously provided that it would apply to dis-
position of spouses' property in event of 
divorce. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Husband and Wife <3=>30 
Prenuptial agreements are enforceable 
as long as there is no fraud, coercion, or 
material nondisclosure. 
2. Husband and Wife <*=>30 
Postnuptial agreement not in contem-
plation of divorce is enforceable absent 
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure. 
3. Husband and Wife e=>31(2) 
Normal rules of contract construction 
would be applied in resolving disagreement 
8. Defendants correctly claim that because the 
decision to allow an interlocutory appeal is dis-
cretionary, defendants might be forced to go 
through an unnecessary trial if the right to file 
an interlocutory appeal of the bindover order is 
denied. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Bruce Matthews, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood and Davidson 
F I L E D 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 8906ff6-CA 
PER CURIAM: 
This interlocutory appeal is taken from a district court 
order denying appellant's motion to quash a bindover order of 
the circuit court on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. We 
affirm. 
An examination of the facts of this case is unnecessary, 
because the issue presented is a legal issue identical" to the 
issue determined in the recent decision of State v. Humphrey, 
No. 890424-CA, slip op. (Utah Ct. App. June 14, 1990). 1That 
decision affirmed district court orders refusing to exercise 
jurisdiction over motions to quash a circuit court bindover 
order. Similarly, the trial court in the present appeal 
entered an order stating that the district court "does not have 
jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of evidence presented at 
preliminary examination in circuit court to determine whether 
the circuit court was correct in binding the matter over to 
District Court" and, on that basis, ordered the motion to quash 
bindover "stricken and/or denied." 
1. This court consolidated two criminal, interlocutory appeals 
for decision. The decision also determined State v. Gordon. 
No. 890130-CA, slip op. (Utah Ct. App. June 14, 1990). 
Appellant's brief in this appeal raises the same legal 
arguments in favor of district court jurisdiction as were 
previously presented in State v. Humphrey and State v. Gordon. 
The decision of this court in State v. Humohrev/State v. Gordon 
is wholly dispositive of this appeal. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
F I L E D 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
^Vaughn Humphxeyj Harry Jamar 
Gordan, and Bruce Mathews, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 890424-CA 
Case No. 890130-CA 
Case No. 890666-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed June 28, 1990, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this ' T ^ day of August, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT 
APPENDIX 2 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 1 
The judicial power of the state shall be 
vested in a supreme court, in a trial court of 
general jurisdiction known as the district court, 
and in such other courts as the legislature by 
statute may establish. The supreme Court, the 
district court, and such other courts designated 
by statute shall be courts of record. Courts not 
of record shall also be established by statute. 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 3 
The supreme court shall have original 
jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
two answer questions of state law certified by a 
court of the United States. The supreme court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other 
matters to be exercised as provided by statute, 
and power to issue all writs and orders necessary 
for the exercise of the supreme Court's 
jurisdiction or the complete determination of any 
cause. 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 4 
The supreme court shall adopt rules of 
procedure and evidence to be used in the courts 
of the state and shall by rule manage the 
appellate process. The legislature may amend the 
rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the 
supreme court upon a vote of two-thirds of all 
members of both houses of the legislature. 
Except as otherwise provided by this 
constitution, the supreme court by rule may 
authorize retired justices and judges and judges 
pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. 
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the 
United States, Utah residents, and admitted to 
practice law in Utah. The supreme court by rule 
shall govern the practice of law, including 
admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to practice law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 5 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by 
this constitution or by statute, and power to 
issue all extraordinary writs. The district 
court shall have appellate jurisdiction as 
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all 
other courts, both original and appellate, shall 
be provided by statute. Except for matters filed 
originally with the supreme court, there shall be 
in all cases an appeal of right from the court of 
original jurisdiction to a court with appellate 
jurisdiction over the cause. 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-3(4) 
(4) "Magistrate" means a justice of the 
Supreme Court, a judge of the district courts, a 
judge of the juvenile courts, a judge of the 
circuit courts, a judge of the justice courts, or 
a judge of any court created by law. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-1-1 
The following are courts of justice in this state: 
(1) the Supreme Court; 
(2) the Court of Appeals; 
(3) the district courts; 
(4) the circuit courts; 
(5) the juvenile courts; and 
(6) the justices' courts. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-1-2 
The courts enumerated in the first five 
subdivisions [subsections] of the preceding 
section [{ 78-1-1] are courts of record. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(5) 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of 
certiorari for review of a Court of Appeals 
adjudication [.] 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all 
writs and process necessary; 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, 
orders, an decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees 
resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals 
from the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, 
except the Public Service Commission, State 
Tax Commission, Board of STate Lands, Board 
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state 
engineer; 
(b) Appeals from the district court 
review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action 
under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, 
except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any 
court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a charge of a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from district court in 
criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital 
felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions 
for extraordinary writs sought by persons 
who are incarcerated or serving any other 
criminal sentence, except petitions 
constituting a challenge to a conviction of 
or the sentence for a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court 
involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, 
support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military 
Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of 
Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion 
only and by the vote of four judges of the court 
may certify to the Supreme Court for original 
appellate review and determination any matter of 
which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with 
the requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its 
review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(e) 
(e) An appeal from an interlocutory order 
may be granted only if it appears that the order 
involves substantial rights and may materially 
affect the final decision or that a determination 
of the correctness of the order before final 
judgment will better serve the administration and 
interests of justice, the order permitting the 
appeal may set forth the particular issue or 
point of law which will be considered and may set 
forth the particular issue or point of law which 
will be considered and may be on such terms, 
including the filing of a bond for costs and 
damages, as the appellate court may determine. 
If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be 
deemed to have been docketed by the granting of 
the petition, and all proceedings subsequent to 
the granting of the petition shall be as, and 
within the time required, for appeals from final 
judgments. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a 
matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and 
will be granted only for special and important 
reasons. The following, while neither 
controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme 
Court's discretion, indicate the character of 
reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of 
appeals has rendered a decision in conflict 
with a decision of another panel of the 
Court of appeals on the same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of state or 
federal law in a way that is in conflict 
with a decision of the Supreme court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of 
appeals has rendered a decision that has so 
far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court 
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme 
Court's power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has 
decided an important question of municipal, 
state, or federal law which has not been, 
but should be, settled by the Supreme Court. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(8) (b) and (c) 
• • • • 
(8) 
• • • • 
(b) If from the evidence a magistrate finds 
probable cause to believe that the crime charged 
has been committed and that the defendant has 
committed it, the magistrate shall order, in 
writing, that the defendant be bound over to 
answer in the district court. The findings of 
probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole 
or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground 
that it was acquired by unlawful means are not 
properly raised at the preliminary examination. 
(c) If the magistrate does not find probable 
cause to believe that the crime charged has been 
committed or that the defendant committed it, the 
magistrate shall dismiss the information and 
discharge the defendant. The magistrate may 
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
an order of dismissal. The dismissal and 
discharge do not preclude the state from 
instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same 
offense. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(c) 
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or 
absence of any proceeding provided for by statute 
or these rules prior to arraignment shall be 
specifically and expressly objected to before a 
plea of guilty is entered or the same is waived. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1) 
(b) ...The following shall be raised at 
least five days prior to trial: 
(1) defenses and objections based on 
defects in the indictment or information 
other than that it fails to show 
jurisdiction in the court or to charge an 
offense, which objection shall be noticed by 
the court at any time during the pendency of 
the proceeding[.] 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(2)(c) 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
.. .. 
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon 
petition for review, the appellate court 
decides that the appeal would be in the 
interest of justice[.] 
